The influence of constructivism on nature of Science as an area of research and as a classroom subject

Influence of constructivism on the teaching of the nature of Science

Just as a constructivist learning theory perspective influenced research conducted on the nature of science, this learning theory perspective also influenced how the nature of science understandings were promoted for teaching in pre-college science classrooms. Prior to the adoption of a constructivist learning theory by many science educators, cognitive science learning theory perspectives dominated learning and instruction in science classrooms.

Science educators promoting the teaching of the nature of science during the era dominated by cognitive science learning theory perspective encouraged science teachers to teach history of science and the general value of an historical approach to science in their classrooms for a better understanding of nature of science. Even before the emergence of the cognitive science learning theory perspective Jenkins (1989) traced the promotion of the teaching of the history of science back to 1850 in Great Britain, and Russell (1981) to the early 1940s in the United States. In the time when the cognitive science perspective became popular, the list of science educators from many countries who have recommended the study of the history of science in high school has become too long to be able to catalog (Solomon et al., 1992). The results of this substantial literature is a list of possible areas of benefits for science education; the most common are (a) a better learning of the concepts of science, (b) increased interest and motivation, (c) an introduction to the philosophy of science, (d) a better attitude of the public towards science, and (e) an understanding of the social relevance of science (Solomon et al., 1992).

To illustrate this point, this paper discusses findings by Duschl (1990) on teaching the nature of science. Duschl says, using a moon metaphor: “What is presently missing in our science curriculum are instructional units that teach about the other face of science – the how” (p. 41). In his article Duschl (1990) argues that science educators have focused upon teaching students “knowledge of science” and forgotten the “knowledge about science” (history of science). Without the latter, students are simply taught “final form science”. They are, in effect, “being told where we are now, without being told how we got there”. He sees three dangers in presenting such a one-sided view. Duschl (1990) warns that students may falsely conclude: (a) all scientific knowledge claims are considered equal in weight, (b) scientific knowledge claims do not interact with others, and (c) scientific theories do not change. It appears that by omitting the history of science, students cannot understand how the “collective mind of science” arrived at the knowledge it holds today.

It shows that the emphasis in articles promoting the teaching of the nature of science ideas, written by science educators using a cognitive science learning theory perspective, was to teach students the history of science in science lessons.

With the emergence of constructivist learning theory in the mid to late 1980s, science educators shifted their emphasis to helping students construct stronger and more generalized cognitive models of scientific ideas. Science educators also appeared to emphasize sequencing in instruction to help students for better construction of scientific models and improving teacher educational programs for better facilitating students in their constructivist classrooms. To illustrate these points, this paper discusses two articles on teaching the nature of science.

In an article Lawson (1999) argued that “sequencing instruction that focuses on scientific reasoning pattern first in observable context and then in non-observable context helps students better understand the nature of science and use scientific reasoning in and beyond the science classroom” (p. 401). To the question “How can we help students develop theoretical reasoning patterns and acquire an accurate understanding of the nature of science?” asked by Lawson, he himself answered with the following statement, “If intellectual development is truly stage-lake, then for “descriptive” students it would appear that we need to immerse them in “hypothetical” contexts and provide lots of opportunities for direct physical experience, for social interaction with others, and for equilibration. Once these students develop hypothetical reasoning patterns, we then need to repeat the process in theoretical contexts. In other words, teachers need to: 1) know where their students are in their intellectual development, 2) be aware of the intellectual demands that instructional tasks place on students reasoning abilities, 3) correctly match instructional contexts with students abilities, and 4) sequence contexts in a way that moves from description and classification, to casual hypothesis testing in familiar contexts, to casual hypothesis testing in not-so-familiar contexts, and then to theory testing (where theories are defined as general explanatory systems that postulate the existence of unseen entities and/or processes) (p. 407).

In another article McComas (2000) argued that “misconceptions about science are most likely due to the lack of philosophy of science content in teacher education programs and the failure of such programs to provide real science research experiences for pre-service teachers while another source of the problem may be the generally shallow treatment of the nature of science in the textbooks to which teachers might turn for guidance” (p. 53). The “myths of science” commonly included in science textbooks, in classroom discourse, and in the minds of adult Americans, which are incorrect representations of the nature of science, are described by McComas as follows:

Hypothesis become theories that in turn becomes laws
Scientific laws and other such ideas are absolute
A hypothesis is an educated guess
A general and universal scientific method exists
Evidence accumulated carefully will result in sure knowledge
Science and its methods provide absolute proof
Science is procedural more than creative
Science and its methods can answer all questions
Scientists are particularly objective
Experiments are the principal route to scientific knowledge
Scientific conclusions are reviewed for accuracy
Acceptance of new scientific knowledge is straightforward
Science models represent reality
Science and technology are identical
Science is a solitary pursuit

McComas warns that “both students and those who teach science must focus on the nature of science itself rather than just its facts and principles, school science must give students an opportunity to experience science and its processes, free of the legends, misconceptions and idealizations inherent in the myths about the nature of the scientific enterprise” (p. 68).

These two articles illustrate the major difference between articles promoting the teaching of the nature of science from cognitive science learning theory perspective from that of a constructivist learning theory perspective. That difference is the shifting of the emphasis on the teaching of the history of science in science classrooms to sequencing in instruction in science lessons and promotion of better teacher preparation programs in the universities.