Asia-Pacific Forum on Science Learning and Teaching, Volume 19, Issue 2, Article 4 (Dec., 2018)
Ilana A. MANNEH, Karim M. HAMZA, Carl-Johan RUNDGREN, and Lars ERIKSSON
The role of anthropomorphisms in students' reasoning about chemical structure and bonding

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Introduction

In this study, we address the potential role anthropomorphisms may play in students' explanations of chemical phenomena. Anthropomorphisms (or analogical anthropomorphisms, or teleological explanations) refer to ascribing human characteristics to non-human objects (Pickett et al. 2000). Although the earlier Piagetian view was that animistic reasoning is an aspect of children's reasoning which, therefore, declines with age (cf. Dorion, 2011; Friedler, Zohar & Tamir, 1993 ), we now know that anthropomorphisms are widespread at all levels of the educational system (Coll & Treagust, 2001; Nicoll, 2001; Taber & Adbo, 2012; Talanquer, 2013), even among science experts (e.g. Kelemen, Rottman & Senton, 2013; Rundgren, et al., 2012). This has led to a concomitant shift in how we view anthropomorphisms in science education, from a discussion of whether they should be allowed or banished, towards an interest in what role they may play in supporting students' emerging understanding of science (Dorion, 2011).

An early discussion of the role of anthropomorphisms in chemistry education is found in Taber and Watts (1996). Based on interviews with A-level chemistry students, they suggested that anthropomorphisms may appear in students' reasoning along a continuum from strong, teleological to weak, more metaphorical renderings of a chemical phenomenon. In a later survey, Talanquer (2013) demonstrated the presence of teleological anthropomorphisms in the majority of college chemistry students' answers to questions specifically designed to distinguish between teleological and causal reasoning. He expressed concern that the presence of anthropomorphisms or teleological reasoning creates a false sense of understanding in students, constituting "a cognitively cheap way of satisfying a need for explanation without having to engage in more complex mechanistic reasoning" (Talanquer, 2013, p. 1423). Talanquer suggested that teachers need to engage their students in comparing and contrasting teleological and causal explanations to take advantage of the anthropomorphisms that they inevitably invoke, while making sure that students do not settle for the teleological answers. Similarly, Dorion (2011), based on a significant number of interviews with year 7-10 students, presented firm evidence of various teleological anthropomorphisms in students' reasoning. However, he was able to show that sometimes, seemingly "strong" anthropomorphisms - as defined by Taber and Watts (1996) - coexisted with significant conceptual development within the wider framework of the subject matter (here, diffusion). Thus, Dorion (2011) suggested that, from a science education perspective, anthropomorphisms should be considered heuristic and potential aids rather than hindrances, and that teachers should therefore allow students to develop these alternative explanations.

It is worth noting, however, that the primary empirical evidence for the role of anthropomorphisms in students' scientific and chemical explanations comes from interviews and surveys. Thus, despite at least around 30 years of discussion of their significance, we still lack a robust understanding of how anthropomorphisms may support students' reasoning in the classroom. This study aims to contribute to such an understanding. Specifically, we present analyses from undergraduate students' reasoning in actual classroom work. We analyze both how the students make use of anthropomorphisms and in what ways their use may support acceptable chemical explanations. Our overarching research question is:

  • How may anthropomorphisms support first-year university students' explanations of chemical structure and bonding during a problem-solving activity?

 


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